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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper uses the structuralist framework of agriculture-industry synergy in an 
economy to discuss the performance of the agricultural and industrial sectors in 
India. The industry – agriculture relationship is argued to be integral to 
economic development as the agriculture sector supplies raw materials, surplus 
labour to the industrial sector and acts as a source of demand for industrial 
goods. However, in India this relationship has been complex. This paper looks 
at the supply side constraints in the agricultural sector and the demand side 
constraints in the industrial sector to assess the poor development and growth 
in the two sectors. It concludes that India has not followed the structuralist 
pattern of sectoral development and poor agricultural growth has not been 
conducive for demand led industrialization, adversely affecting factor markets 
for both labour and land. 
 
Key words: India, Industry-agriculture linkages, liberalisation, demand 
constraints, growth  
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, India has drawn attention of global investors, policy 
makers and media for a maintained stunning economic growth rate of 7 – 9 
percent until recently1, while the United States and the European Union are 
experiencing low growth especially in the context of the current financial crisis. 
With a population of 1.18 billion (GOI 2006), it is expected that this high growth 
rate will make India a major player in the global economy. The prolonged 
recession and uncertainty in developed economies has made a section of 
global investors think about India as their potential investment destination. The 
global policy makers are also watching India’s experience with interest.  
 
However, a closer look at the Indian economy will reveal that growth is 
sector specific in favour of the service sector and is not inclusive (D’Costa 
2011). Growth in the industry and the agriculture sector that employ the majority 
of the work force in the country has been less than impressive (Rao 2009).  
High GDP growth and slow growth in agriculture has skewed sectoral GDP 
against agriculture. In theory, the declining share of agriculture to overall growth 
is inherent to the process; however, this needs to be accompanied by a decline 
in workforce dependent on agriculture. The growth in India has not created 
enough opportunity for people working in the rural sector to move out of 
agriculture (Reddy and Mishra 2009). This is because the Indian organized 
sector experienced very slow growth in employment (even less than 1 percent) 
owing to which the Indian experience has been one of jobless growth’.  This 
structural unevenness of growth, coupled with disproportionate policy and 
economic interventions in the past decades have led to the emergence of an 
                                                 
1
 "IMF lowers India's growth forecast to 6.1 percent for 2012""Indian economy to grow 6.9 percent in 2012–13:World 
Bank"Though in 2011-12 India’s growth rate declined to 6.5 percent (http://ibnlive.in.com/news/indias-gdp-growth-
slumps-to-65-pc-in-201112/263198-7.html). It declined further to 5.4 percent during April to September 2012-13 and the 
government on lowered the growth projection for the current financial year to 5.7-5.9 per cent from 7.6 per cent 
estimated earlier(http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Govt-lowers-growth-projection-for-current-
fiscal-to-5-7-in-2012-13/articleshow/17648415.cms)  
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inter-sectoral disequilibrium marked by slow industrialization and agrarian crisis 
(see Ramakumar 2010).  
 
The relationship between the agricultural and industrial sectors is crucial 
in terms of its linkages (see Henley 2012 for Sub-Saharan Africa). However, 
uneven patterns of growth in the two sectors, historically and in the post reform 
periods has had socio-economic and political implications that have translated 
into poor growth and crisis (K.N. Raj in Kannan 2012).  In this paper, using the 
framework of agriculture-industry relationship we discuss the problems in the 
agriculture sector, deteriorating linkages between the two sectors, challenges 
and constraints and the implications it has on growth. In particular, we will 
discuss the issue of structural challenges in the agriculture sector and its 
implications on industrial growth. We will also discuss the challenges of land 
availability for agriculture and industrialization, transfer of labour and the 
problem of rising food prices.  
 
The paper is divided into four sections. The first section is a theoretical 
framework of the agriculture industry relationship in development of an 
economy. Here we discuss the ‘industrializer’ and ‘agrarianist’ views that focus 
on the different sectoral priorities in the process of development. The second 
section deals with the supply side constraints in agriculture because of 
structural challenges that exist in the sector. The problem of neo-liberal policies 
namely withdrawal of food, fertilizer and credit subsidy and in consequence 
rising cost of production, poor access to credit and technology along with 
decline in selling price of agricultural commodities made production condition in 
Indian agriculture non-viable (Narayanamoorthy 2007). The demand side 
constraints and the challenges of industrialisation in India are discussed in the 
fourth section. Here we argue the demand constrained nature of 
industrialisation in India and its implications in development. Poor development 
in the agrarian sector has acted as brakes to industrialisation. The last section 
deals with the present challenges to the agricultural sector and the constraints 
4 
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faced by the industrial sector. In this section, we specifically discuss the issue of 
rising food prices and the availability of land for agriculture and industrialization.  
THE INDUSTRY-AGRICULTURE LINKAGE  
Agriculture contributes to the growth of industries particularly through 
food for the population, labour for the expanding industries, raw materials for 
certain industries, wage goods for workforce and savings to finance industrial 
investments. While the rural population is the consumer of goods produced by 
the industrial sector, it also depends on the industrial sector for inputs like 
chemicals and fertilizers and machinery.    
In the development discourse there has been some debate about the nature 
and sectoral focus of the developmental process. Some ‘industrialisers’ think 
that development can only be achieved through industrialization, while 
‘agrarianists’ propose that agriculture is the key to development. In the 1950’s 
and the decade that followed, the dominant discourse on the role of agriculture 
were dominated by industrialisers like Prebisch (1950), Lewis (1954), 
Hirschman (1958) Fei and Ranis (1964) among others who saw agriculture as 
the only source of productivity that could be used to drive industrialisation and 
modernisation through the transfer of savings2. According to Timmer (2002), 
this view was not seen as an urban bias, rather as an important aspect of 
development as it was believed that any attempt to help agriculture would only 
slow the economic growth process.  
 
Arthur Lewis (1954) opined that the agricultural sector plays an important 
role as a supplier of surplus to the industry. This view saw the ‘traditional’ 
agricultural sector providing support for modernization of industry in two ways. 
First, the ‘supply’ of agricultural surpluses over time acts as a driving force to 
the industrial growth and second, the unlimited supply of labour at a constant 
real wage, which is higher than that of the real wage in agriculture. For Lewis 
the agriculture-industry analysis and consequent question of industrialization 
appears as a supply side problem alone where demand for industrial goods was 
                                                 
2
Agriculture savings is acquired from taxation of exports, low agricultural prices, high prices on manufactured goods and 
overhauling the exchange rate (Timmer 2002).  
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not discussed. Lewis can be described as an industrializer that prescribed that 
industrialization is not at all possible without extraction of surplus from 
agriculture. (Ghatak and Ingersent 1984)  
 
Kaldor (1967), Mellor (1976), Adelman (1984) among others made 
particular emphasis on demand side problem of industrialization. They 
emphasized that ‘growth of the agricultural surplus is an essential condition to 
increase purchasing power necessary for sustaining industrial expansion’. 
Kaldor pointed out that while agricultural surplus is determined endogenously 
within the system, industrial expansion depends largely on ‘outside stimuli’ 
provided by the demand from agricultural sector. He says that for the sake of 
sustained industrialization the terms of trade between the two sectors should be 
in favour of agriculture, as it would benefit the industrial sector through 
increased purchasing power. Adelman (1984) emphasised the importance of 
the increase in agricultural productivity through technological innovations in 
agriculture would create a surplus that would keep food prices stable while 
increasing the demand for industrial goods in his ‘Agriculture Demand Led 
Industrialisation’ strategy.  
 
Both industrializer and agrarianists portray industry and agriculture 
(synonymous to urban and rural) as separate but homogenous and 
undifferentiated entities. Lipton (1977) states that ‘The most important class 
conflict in the poor countries of the world today is not between labour and 
capital … It is between the rural classes and the urban classes’. In the Indian 
context the persistence of ‘rural bias’ (Byres 1979), ‘landlord bias’ (Kay 2006), 
or class domination through control over resources made agriculture, industry 
and the rural and urban sectors internally differentiated among economic 
groups. Despite terms of trade being in favour of agriculture in India for decades 
after independence, neither the industry nor rural poor benefit from it. The rural 
rich reaped the benefits of favourable terms of trade in agriculture and 
discriminated against the rural resource poor by blocking of land reform, 
resisting the implementation of minimum wage, social security legislation etc. 
6 
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Mitra (1977) in Indian context states that the landlord class through its political 
influence maintained the inter-sectoral terms of trade in its favour. It also held 
back industrial expansion through a squeeze on profit. Patnaik (1987) showed 
that the landlords in rural sector appropriated gains from favourable terms of 
trade and the practice of trying ‘to maintain their profit by reducing the share of 
wages in the net value added in agriculture’. This according to him this was 
detrimental in failing to raise demand for industrial goods. 
NEO-LIBERAL REFORM, ‘WITHERED AWAY OF STATE’ AND SQUEEZED 
AGRICULTURE IN HANDS OF COERCIVE MARKET  
Agricultural development in India prior to liberalization in 1991 can be 
categorized into three phases. The first stage being the reform and 
consolidation stage of the 1950’s and 1960’s followed by the green revolution 
stage of the 1970’s and further belated green revolution in eastern states along 
with anti-poverty policy during 1980’s. The political economy that succeeded 
colonial rule in India had the primary task of redistributing resources through a 
politically guided process of development. During this stage policies like the 
abolition of intermediaries, reduction of land revenue and expansion of irrigation 
facilities were initiated to deal with the institutional problems that were hindering 
growth and development in this sector (Kalecki 1972). However, concrete 
redistributive measures through land reform for agricultural development did not 
take place as ruling classes formed alliances with ‘dominant propriety classes’ 
consisting  of industrial capitalists, the erstwhile zamindars and jotedars and 
rich farmers. These groups benefited from the halted and poorly motivated land 
reform initiative and also agricultural support and subsidies, the incentives of 
the green revolution (Bardhan 1984, Bhaduri 1984).  
 
The green revolution in India marked a change in the attitude of the state 
towards agriculture. Hitherto the state had no concrete agrarian policy and its 
main role was to enable production growth and redistribution (Kohli 1987). 
However, agriculture policy failure, diminishing popularity of the Congress party 
and food shortage and dependence on foreign aid led to the adoption of the 
7 
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‘new approach’ in agricultural development in the 1970’s (ibid). The new 
approach changed agriculture in India into a cash based individual enterprise 
that required high investment, modern inputs and wage labour (Suri 2006). 
Despite making the country self-sufficient in food grains, the outreach of the 
program was limited to crops like rice, wheat and maize in regions that had 
access to irrigation. The remaining 60 percent of agricultural land growing other 
crops did not benefit. The outcome of this new policy were increased inter-
regional inequalities, inter-personal inequality, intercrop imbalances, fluctuating 
outputs and environmental degradation due to poor land and crop management 
(Prasad et al 2007). The interregional inequality, however, reduced to a limited 
extent as some parts of the country particularly the eastern states like West 
Bengal, Bihar and Orissa experienced belated green revolution (Rao 1992). At 
the same time, the interpersonal inequality also declined to a limited extent with 
the implementation of the anti-poverty policies like Intensive Rural Development 
Programme (IRDP) and National Rural Employment Programme (NREP). As a 
result of the latter rural poverty declined substantially during 1980s. (Byres 
1997).  Liberalization of the Indian economy initiated in 1991 began in the 
industrial and service sectors and was driven by macroeconomic instability. It 
was theoretically assumed that the liberalization of industrial imports would 
restore terms of trade and the exchange rate would be rectified once the 
protection of industries is removed and therefore ‘advancing the cause’ of 
agriculture (Balakrishnan et al. 2008). However, after 20 years of neo-liberal 
reform the problems of sustainability, poor growth and development in agrarian 
sector persists. At the same time, people directly or indirectly depending on 
agriculture are faced with immiserization following high cost of production and 
low selling price.  
 
Growth in the agricultural sector in terms of both gross product and 
output has decelerated in the period after 1991. From 3.08 percent during 1980- 
1990 the growth rate in agriculture has come down to 2.57 during 1992 to 2006 
(Reddy and Mishra 2009). In terms of production, in the post reform period 
(1993-2006) saw a decline in the growth rate of food grains to 1.16 from 2.85 
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during the 1980’s.  The growth of all crops was again dropped to 1.09 from 2.56 
in the previous period (Bhalla 2007). What is alarming is that this growth is 
below the rate of population growth in the country. The reason for this poor rate 
of growth has been attributed to neo-liberal policy interventions discussed 
earlier.  
 
According to the Situation Assessment Survey of farmers conducted by 
the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) in 2003 about 27 percent of 
farmers did not like their ancestral profession as it had become unprofitable. 
About 40 percent of farmers were willing to quit this profession due to non-
viability of agriculture. The current situation prevailing in the agriculture sector 
has been termed as a crisis due to reasons of increased costs of production, 
poor selling price, decline in investments and capital formations in rural areas, 
poor access to credit, poor innovation and technological development and 
information asymmetry.  
 
Increased Cost of Production following Withdrawal of Subsidy and 
Imbalance in Input Combination 
The post liberalisation regime began the gradual withdraw subsidies on 
fertilizer and to relied on the market to determine its price3. This resulted in the 
steep increase in fertilizer prices, driving up the cost of production in agriculture.  
During 1991-92 to 2008-09 the price of Diammonium Phosphate (DAP) 
increased about 92.4 percent, the prices of Potash increased by 162.1 percent 
and the prices of urea increased by 67 percent4. The worst impact of this 
decontrol of fertilizers was the sharp increase in imbalance in the consumption 
of nitrogen-phosphate-potash ratio causing severe loss of soil fertility (Rao 
2005b: 62-3). Table 1 shows the change in the cost of production of ten major 
crops between 1990-91 to 2005-06. Cotton showed the highest increase of 225 
percent followed by bajra (194 percent) and Maize (176 percent). It should be 
noted that the latter two crops are predominantly produced and consumed by 
                                                 
3
 Withdrawal of input subsidies was a major point in the Agreement of Agriculture negotiations of the WTO. It also 
became a major point of conflict due to the OECD countries reluctance to reduce them in their countries.  
4
 Fertilizer Statistics in India, Various Issues.  
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the poor. The two major green revolution crops in India, wheat and paddy saw 
an increase in cost of production by 165 percent and 169 percent respectively.  
 
Table 1: Selected Crop-wise Cost of Production in India (1990-1991 to 
1997-1998 and 2005-2006) 
(Average cost Rs, Per Quintal) 
Crops/States 1990-
91 
1991-
92 
1992-
93 
1994-
95 
1995-
96 
1996-
97 
1997-
98 
2005-
06 
% 
increase 
Paddy  213,12 252,67 270,25 344,14 340,62 375,19 410,58 574,71 169.66 
Bajra 228,26 313,51 263,77 274,62 534,31 403,11 343,21 670,14 193.59 
Maize 206,83 308,43 235,24 353,75 321,77 531,17 469,24 570,74 175.95 
Wheat 205,83 232,00 261,39 323,93 345,67 389,39 418,02 547,00 165.75 
Urad 600,89 926,04 642,49 993,81 1119,41 1190,01 1218,84 1647,80 174.23 
Groundnut  701,26 759,00 834,04 1018,84 1051,66 1074,16 1158,83 1585,63 126.11 
Rapeseed & 
Mustard  
498,87 567,23 637,82 690,12 746,96 847,76 1234,03 1198,04 140.15 
Cotton  701,27 803,62 756,55 1246,85 1505,27 1537,98 2198,67 2277,47 224.76 
Sugarcane 22,81 21,71 27,40 36,90 42,89 39,57 47,58 - 108.59 
Source : Agricultural Research Data Book 2002, & Ministry of Agriculture 
 
Lowering of Selling Prices with the Collapse of PDS and Agricultural 
Marketing  
Since 1991 the farmers in India have become exposed to the market 
determined value of output (selling prices) which were always hitherto at the 
lower level of government announced Minimum Support Price (MSP). According 
toKannan (2012) real value of support price (deflated by respective commodity 
specific Wholesale Price Index) has actually declined though nominal value of 
support price may have increased. With the introduction of targeted PDS 
system which only BPL card holder can benefit) FCI requires far less grain than 
before and therefore restricted purchase of grains from farmers. The recent 
amendments of Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee (APMC) Act in fact 
dissolved the government Mandis, and pushing farmers towards corporate retail 
chain, which control villages supply chain with stringent terms and conditions 
(Mehta 2005). Narayanamoorthy (2007) estimates the ratio between values of 
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output to cost of cultivation at less than one in 2001-02 for Cotton, Paddy, 
Sugar Cane, and Groundnut.  
Decline in Investment and Capital Formation in Agriculture 
According to the Situation Assessment Survey in 2003 conducted by 
NSSO (Report No. 497) a record 96 percent of farmers are running into a deficit 
as their consumption exceeded their income (negative investment). The deficit 
increases when we factor in net investment in productive assets (Patnaik 2007). 
India as a whole registered a small positive surplus, but a large number of state 
exhibited deficits. Between 1991-92 (48th round) and 2002-03 (59th round), there 
is absolute decline in the numbers of bovines, by 8 million ovines by 4 million, 
and poultry by 11 million. About 90 percent of farmers owned lower livestock 
numbers in 2002-03 as compared with 1991-92. Despite the decline in average 
size of landholding during 1992 and 2002-03 the percentage of landless 
households increased from 21.9 percent to 32 percent. The inequality of land 
holding measured in terms of Gini Coefficient for operated land increased from 
0588 to 0.694 during the same period5.    
Capital formation in agriculture is one of main factors in increasing 
production to meet the requirements of the increasing population and to reduce 
market and environment risk of producers. The Public Sector plays an important 
role in directing growth and pattern of agriculture investment.  In 2006-07 the 
Gross Capital Formation (GCF) in agriculture by the public sector was only 26 
percent of total GCF in agriculture and 8.2 percent of the total GCF of the 
country. The trends in public sector capital formations as a share of total GCF 
from 1989-90 to 2007-08 has shown a declining trend (Table 2). Although total 
share of GCF in the Indian economy has grown by CAGR of 15 percent, the 
share of GCF in agriculture to the total share has declined. Even within the 
agriculture sector, there is an increase in private sector share in capital 
formation compared to the public sector and this has been declining rapidly.   
 
 
                                                 
5
 Calculation by authors from NSSO 48
th
 and 59
th
 round data.  
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Table 2: Gross Capital Formation in Agriculture and Allied Sector in India 
Year GCF in Agriculture &  Allied Sector (at current price in crores) Share of Agriculture & Allied 
Sector in Total GCF (%) 
Public  
Sector 
Private  
Sector 
Total % of Private to 
Public Sector GCFC 
Public 
Sector 
Private 
Sector 
Total 
1989-90 3354 5833 9187 63,49 7,2 8,8 8,2 
1995-96 6762 14605 21367 68,35 7,4 5,9 6,3 
2001-02 10353 51285 61638 83,20 6,6 13,5 11,5 
2002-03 9563 52319 61882 84,55 6,4 11,5 10,2 
2003-04 12218 49249 61467 80,12 7 9,1 8,6 
2004-05 16182 62666 78848 79,48 6,7 8,1 7,8 
2005-06 20739 76818 97557 78,74 7,1 8,2 7,9 
2006-07 25606 78883 104489 75,49 7,1 7 7 
2007-08 27379 101287 128666 78,72 6,2 7,4 7,1 
CAGR 
(1989-08) 
11,8 16,21 14,9 1,14 -0,78 -0,91 -0,76 
CAGR 
(2000-08) 
14,90 72,99 11,09 -0,79 -0,89 -8,23 -6,66 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India (2011) 
 
Decline in Access to Credit 
Trade liberalization and internal market liberalisation in the form of 
changes in subsidy regimes and institutional credit has brought about changes 
in the agricultural sector. In the absence of institutional support to enable 
adaption there have emerged some inconsistencies at the production level in 
the agricultural sector.  Access to credit for cultivation is a major concern in 
India today. According to the 2001 census, only 20.24 percent of operational 
landholding has access to credit. The break-up further shows that the in the 
largest landholding segment which is the small and marginal landholdings only 
14.04 percent have access while medium and large holdings have 33.13 
percent and 29.38 percent respectively (figure2). This is because the medium 
and large farms have initial endowment of assets which they offer as collateral 
to access credit (Bhattacharyya 2005, GOI 2008: 14) The increase in costs of 
12 
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cultivation (table 1) and the crunch for credit to buy inputs have led to the re-
emergence of the hegemony of the money lender in rural India (Satyasai 2008). 
According to NSSO survey, moneylender’s share in total credit increased from 
10.7 percent in 1991 to 25.7 percent in 2003. The spate of farmer’s suicides in 
different states in India in the last decade has also been associated with debt 
and increased risks in agriculture production (Shetty 2009, Suri 2006) 
 
Figure 2: Size of Operational Landholdings and Percentage of Access to 
Institutional Credit (2001-02) 
 
Source: Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, Agricultural Census 
Division 
 
Arrested Technological Innovation and information dissemination 
systems  
Technology is an important component in agriculture and development. 
Proponents of the technocratic approach argue that development in agriculture 
through increase in yields through innovation and technology helps create 
marketable surplus for development. The green revolution in India was the first 
65286 
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step taken towards the technocratic approach after almost two decades of trying 
the institutional approach.  
 
The new industrial policy of 1986 and the seed policy of 1988 reclassified 
biotechnology firms as core industries and the liberalization drive allowed 
private players to enter seed production (Ramakumar 2010). Post 1991, a major 
changes in seed sector came about with the introduction of Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR) as per the WTO agreement. However, these changes did not bring 
about changes in production patterns as expected. Bhalla and Singh (2009) 
notes that technology adoption in the 1980’s brought about high growth rates in 
yield and crop diversification than in the post 1991 period. They point out that 
decline in public investment in irrigation and water management and research 
had adverse effects. In certain states, the adoption of crops like cotton did to an 
extent raise output and income levels, but at the same time, it also exposed 
them to agro-climatic risks and price fluctuation risks. Technological changes in 
seed and inputs increased the cost of production in agriculture, which made 
inputs more difficult to access for resource poor farmers. Technological change 
in the Indian agricultural sector is hindered by problems of access and poor 
dissemination. The state plays an important role in making available cheap and 
accessible technology. The general trend in real public expenditure on 
agricultural research and extension show that there has been a decline (Table 
3). Private investment on agricultural research and extension cannot be a 
solution as it has been narrowly focussed on commercial crops suitable for 
irrigated region that may give profits and neglects the question of technology 
required for dry land agriculture (Kannan 2012).  
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Table 3: Growth in Real Public Expenditure on Agricultural Research and 
Extension ( percent per annum) 
Period Growth rate in Public Expenditure in 
Research and Education  Extension and training  
1960s 6.5 10.7 
1970s 9.5 -0.1 
1980-1994 6.3 7.0 
1990-2005 4.8 2.0 
Source: Balakrishnan, Golait and Kumar (2008)in Ramakumar (2010) 
 
Asymmetric information and information costs add to transaction cost 
and affects production decisions and the supply response. In order to reduce 
both controllable market risks and uncontrollable agro-climatic risks, effective 
information dissemination systems and streamlined and accessible marketing 
channels need to be in place. Transfer of technology is also another important 
dimension that needs to be address to rectify the supply problem. The public 
extension system is an important means of transfer of technology and effective 
information dissemination system. We have seen from Table 3 growth rate of 
public expenditure on extension and training declined from 7 percent during 
1980-94 to 2 percent during 1990-2005.The Working Group on Agricultural 
Extension for the Eleventh Plan pointed out the due to the shortage of public 
expenditure, public extension system in most states in India collapsed 
(Kannan2012). Rao (2005b) and Vyas (2008) also indicated failure of public 
extension system as one of the prime causes of bad performance of agriculture 
since early 1990s. In the absence of an effective public extension system, a 
coercive form of ‘input dealer led extension system’ fills the gap (Kannan 
2012).With the production strain to meet the demands of rising population and 
the precarious environmental balance that presently exists, it is important for 
technology to step in, in a big way. Yields and land use intensities are below 
potential in India and institutional change and public investments are necessary 
requisites to address them.  
15 
Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2013-40 
DEMAND CONSTRAINTS, LIBERALIZATION AND INDUSTRIALIZATION 
The problem of industrialization in India is primarily demand constraint 
from agriculture. Agriculture provides home market for industrial goods and in 
India where almost 56 percent of population engaged in agriculture 
(exceptionally high figure, compared to 4 -6 percent in developed 
economies).This huge stock of low productive, and therefore, low income 
population in agriculture can be seen as the latent source of Lewisian supply of 
labour force for industrialization.  
 
According to many scholars (Nayyar (1978), Chakraborty (1974), 
Sengupta, Kannan and Ravendran 2008, Mazumdar 2009) agriculture acted as 
a brake against industrialization in India due to the inadequacy of wage good 
surpluses and investible resources. In addition, agricultural raw material was 
restricted and the demand for industrial goods dried up. The latter was due to 
the severe inequality in agriculture and a vast majority of rural poor not having 
the purchasing power to buy industrial goods. The terms of trade was in favour 
of agriculture for nearly three decades after independence, but the benefits of it 
had been appropriated only by the rural oligarchy (Mitra 1977). The rural poor 
not having adequate purchasing power to buy food grains led to the shrinking of 
industrial goods market in rural India6. 
 
The enhanced purchasing power or excess demand for industrial goods 
cannot be generated from rural India unless interclass inequality can be curbed 
(Sengupta, Kannan and Raveendran 2008). Industry does not gain from 
expanding market in the agricultural sector; rather it is faced with enhanced cost 
of production due to food price inflation, increased price of raw material, and 
withdrawal of the fertilizer, food and credit subsidy during liberalization era. 
Under these circumstances, industry has no other alternatives but to divert its 
production for the requirements of middle class and urban consumers, which is 
relatively small and saturated.  
                                                 
6
 That was the reason there was a pile up of foodgrain stock till early 2000s. The policy makers thought it as other way 
round, that is, low effective demand for food due to rise in income and excess supply of foodgrains (Rao 2005a, 2005b). 
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According to a number of scholars, curbing of the inequality is the key to 
resolve the agrarian as well industrial impasse (Bagchi 1970, Nayyar 1978, 
Sengupta et al 2008, Mazumdar 2009). With NSSO data, Nayyar showed that 
the size class wise expenditure pattern of industrial commodities is highly 
skewed. In other words, a large portion of demand for industrial production 
originated from a narrow segment of population. With such a ‘narrow demand 
base’ the market for industrial goods must be limited and temporary as the 
demand for luxury goods on the part of a small fraction of population is likely to 
reach saturation point. Bagchi (1970) blamed government for failing to exercise 
effective control over allocation of resources between essential and non-
essential on the one hand and consumption and saving on the other. While the 
former reflected in excessive importance of luxury goods in industrial 
production, the latter made government a failure in mobilizing domestic 
resources.   
 
The problem rather than coming to an end was in fact intensified since 
the early nineties with the beginning of economic reforms. In the sphere of 
industrialization all the old legacies of big public sector enterprises backed by 
the strong policy of import substitution was scrapped. India framed its policies in 
the direction of the Washington Consensus, like privatization of the public sector 
units, giving tax incentives and other benefits to the corporate sector and 
liberalizing exports and imports.  
 
During the liberalization period Government of India’s New Industrial 
Policy was designed to give huge subsidies and concessions to the corporate 
houses particularly to foreign investors rather than to create new purchasing 
power for the rural poor.  Both India and China have had similar problems in 
rural sector development and have followed a similar industrialization focused 
development trajectories in their early stages of development.  In India, 
protection of the industrial sector without commensurate protection of 
agriculture shifted the terms of trade against agriculture and dis-incentivized the 
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sector (Balakrishnan et al. 2008). This protection led to an overvalued exchange 
rate in an attempt to keep the deficit artificially low, resulting in stunting the 
intrinsically competitive agricultural sector (ibid).  In China, the strategy was to 
promote ‘urban industries with capital intensive technology’ (Fan, Chan-Kang, 
and Mukherjee 2005) and in order to achieve this, it introduced the strict control 
of rural urban migration through the ‘hukou’ system7 and through an urban 
rationing system that maintained low prices and a low urban consumption of 
agricultural products (ibid).  
 
When China initiated its economic reforms in 1978, it started with its 
agriculture sector unlike India, where reforms were driven by macroeconomic 
instability and reforms began in the manufacturing sector (Fan Shenggen and 
Gulati 2008). While the logic of the Indian reforms was that the liberalization of 
industrial imports would correct the ‘bias’ and restore the balance of trade 
(Balakrishnan et al. 2008), China approach was different. It first incentivized its 
agriculture markets and created institutions required for a market economy 
before gradually opening up their markets (Fan Shenggen and Gulati 2008). 
According to the ‘Economic Outlook for 2007-08’ of the Economic Advisory 
Council, Indian agriculture indicators India has a comparative advantage over 
China in terms of arable land (161 to 130 million hectares), irrigated land (55.8 
to 54.5 million hectares) and average land holding (1.4 to 0.4 hectares)8. 
Despite this the average yield in China in most food crops is twice as much as 
in India and the agricultural sector has had a sustained growth between 4-5 
percent for the past 15 years compared to India’s 2-2.5 percent. 
CHALLENGES OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AND CONSTRAINTS OF 
INDUSTRIALISATION  
The debate of agricultural development and industrialization by the 
agrarianist and the industrializers bring out the issue that development of the 
agrarian sector and development of industry. The relative terms of trade (ToT) 
                                                 
7
The Hukou system was a residency permit that was issued to every family that demarcated their right of residency and 
employment to a specified locality.  This severely restricted the movement of people especially from rural to urban 
areas. 
8
http://www.hindu.com/2007/09/03/stories/2007090355411000.htm 
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between agriculture and industry plays an important role the respective sectors 
competitiveness. If ToT is favourable towards the agricultural sector, higher 
incomes in the sector will lead to an increased demand for industrial goods. 
However, the adverse effect of a favourable ToT is that a productive agricultural 
sector would have increased wages that will affect labour transfer and 
accumulation. In the case of India, as mentioned early the rural elites benefited 
from the favourable terms of trade. The challenges both sectors face are the 
rising  prices of food and agricultural raw material , land availability for industrial 
and agricultural development and the poor migration flow from the rural to the 
urban areas following the pattern of jobless and service led growth of the 
economy.  
 
Food inflation in India today is a big concern. In the past two years, food 
prices in India rose in line with the world food prices and when the prices began 
a downward trend at the global level, the Indian scenario saw a continued 
increase. Although drought and subsequent fall in production is blamed for this, 
such sustained upward trends in prices have not been witnessed in previous 
instance like 2002-03 drought induced supply shock where the food price 
increase was only 3-4 percent (Chand 2010, 10, Kumar, et al 2010). The 
present price shock in food has been a result of increasing demand for ‘grain 
intensive animal production’ in a situation, where, as discussed earlier, absolute 
number of cattle and poultry declined during 1991 to 2002-03 apart from 
indebtedness and asset loss during the same period. This is partly due to the 
increased price of feed following grain output stagnation.  The effects of price 
rise on food have a detrimental effect on industrial wages. Table 3 gives the CPI 
numbers using 1982 and 2001 as the base years for industrial workers from 
1990 to 2010. The CPI food index has increased by 62 percent since 1990 
using 1982 as the base year and 28 percent from 2006-2010 using 2001 as the 
base year.  
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Table 4: Consumer Price Index Number for Industrial Workers (General 
and Food) in India (1990 to 2010) 
Year GeneralIndex FoodIndex 
I-Base 1982=100   
1990-91 193 199 
1991-92 219 230 
1992-93 240 254 
1993-94 258 272 
1994-95 284 304 
1995-96 313 337 
1996-97 342 369 
1997-98 366 388 
1998-99 414 445 
1999-00 428 446 
2000-01 444 453 
2001-02 463 466 
2002-03 482 477 
2003-04 500 495 
2004-05 520 506 
2005-06* 540 526 
II-Base 2001=100    
2006-07 125 126 
2007-08 133 136 
2008-09 145 153 
2009-10 163 176 
Source: Ministry of Labour, Government of India.  
 
With the population increasing at 1.4 percent annually9, the need for 
rapid growth in food production is necessary. In the light of increased cost of 
production in agriculture, low transfer of technology and structural challenges 
the strain for agricultural land is also a major concern. The need for land for 
industrial development on one hand and the position of agricultural land on the 
other has led to the emergence of tension between sectors for land.  
                                                 
9
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW 
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The objective of Indian land reform were abolition of intermediaries 
(landlords), empowering the sharecroppers and acquisition and re-distribution of 
ceiling surplus land among landless or near landless. In essence, the logic of 
the initiation of land reforms in India was to empower the rural poor. This 
theoretically could create a robust market for industrial goods.  However, the 
government failed to realize the demand constraint nature of slow 
industrialization. Particularly during the liberalization period, the government 
concentrated more on the supply side macroeconomic management, which was 
the core philosophy of the Washington Consensus.  
 
The SEZ (Special Economic Zone) Act was finalised by the government 
of India in 2005. According to this Act these zones were to be ‘carriers of 
economic prosperity’ aiming to boost economic growth at a fast rate, assuming 
that affluence in the rural areas through infrastructural facilities and job 
provision in manufacturing and other services would go along with it. Following 
the passing of this Act, a number of Indian states cutting across political 
ideologies raced to set up SEZ in their respective state by giving enormous 
concessions and incentives to the investors. A few of which are 
- each SEZ is considered as a foreign territory and duty free zone 
- 100 percent exemption from income, sales or service tax for first five 
years, and 50 percent exemption for the next five years 
- freedom from environment income assessment 
-  allowance to bypass state electricity regulatory commission and state 
taxes on raw material 
- Assurance of all basic infrastructure on priority.  
 
The SEZ act in essence aimed at providing land for industrial 
development and incentivizing it. This model of incentivization has been 
common in many emerging economies and the results have been a mixed bag. 
The SEZ in China aimed at earning foreign exchange and encouraging regional 
development. China did not encourage any national bourgeoisie to grow that 
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could potentially challenge the socialist system. Instead, these zones were 
meant to insulate the rest of the economy from the disruptive effects of 
capitalism (Gopalakrishnan 2007). Ge (1999) described Chinese SEZ as a 
‘window’ thorough, which ‘the rest of the domestic economy could be connected 
to the outside world, even without leaving the door wide open’. The productivity, 
growth rate and employment generations in Chinese SEZ were phenomenal 
(Ge 1999). However, China also faced peasant protest against land 
expropriation. (Walker 2006,Guo 2001).  China has been able to control them, 
partly because land is the state property (Ge 1999). In spite of that China had 
many negative aspects of industrialization, like creation of speculative bubbles 
(Wong 1987), low compensation for evicted people (Cartier 2001), child labour 
(Weil 1996), high crime rates including sex trade in the industrial towns and 
SEZs (Goswami 2007).      
 
In India, the industrial sector has been facing a shortage of land for 
development. As the SEZ initiative turns to agricultural land to meet its demand, 
it has stirred up much opposition and debate. However, the dynamics of 
agricultural land needs to be understood in order to address the issue of land 
for industries.  The three main losses a small farmer has to be compensated for 
is his land, family security and the rights to commons (Sau 2007). In the post 
liberalisation period, land acquisition has become highly speculative. The 
emergence of an industrial project is expected to raise the price of land, 
therefore farmers often to hold out from selling their land (ibid). In many cases, 
land mafias buy land from the farmers for speculative purpose. Although this 
makes the state an important player in providing industry with land and in 
assuring proper rights and compensations are meted to farmers.  
 
Transfer of labour from rural areas to urban areas as a part of the 
Lewisian model is an essential component for development. The two 
hypothesises by which this is said to function (as push and pull factors) is a 
population growth putting a strain on rural resources and pushing landless 
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labour into urban areas in search of work and b) as cities develop opportunities 
for employment draw surplus labour into the cities (Williamson 1988).  
 
In a country like India, the appropriate economic policy is that promotes 
high employment content (Bhaduri 1996). Despite high growth rate in the 
economy, the level of employment in absolute term in organized manufacturing 
remained almost constant since the beginning of the liberalization period 
(Patnaik 2007). Although all the existing big manufacturing units expanded their 
production, their employment rates have witnessed a downward trend 
(Banerjee-Guha 2008) and the liberalization era can be described as on one of 
jobless growth.  
 
The inequality of the income distribution also largely increased during the 
liberalization period. The land and asset inequality particularly in rural areas 
increased (National Sample Survey Organization, different rounds).Therefore 
the basic features of the crisis as showed by Nayyar (1978) and Bagchi (1970) 
in fact deepened during the liberalization period (Patnaik 2005). The narrow 
demand base of the industry becomes narrower. A group of affluent middle 
class has come up who are socially confident, globally active, economically 
visible, technologically suave, and youthfully smart (D’Costa 2010). 
 
This affluent small class though very small as a share of Indian 
population (may be 10-15 percent) but in absolute number its size (around 100 -
150 million) may be far greater than any European country. This is why during 
the liberalization period there was some expansion of automobiles, IT or 
software industry which are generally demanded by the rising middle classes. 
This is in spite of the fact that during the liberalization period the employment in 
manufacturing sector alone remained stagnant and the share of secondary 
sector in GDP in fact declined from 29 percent to 22 percent during nineties 
(Patnaik 2005). The problem remains as Nayyar (1978) pointed out that this 
market for Indian industry becomes limited and temporary. Apart from the fact 
that nothing like Lewisian transformation is possible because the surplus labour 
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from agriculture cannot find employment in manufacturing sector because of the 
latters’ employment stagnation (Patnaik 2005).  
CONCLUSION  
India has not followed a set path of development as chalked out be the 
industrializers and the agrarianists. At various stages, the emphasis and the 
policy focus have shifted. What has been agreed upon is the importance of the 
interdependence and the linkages between the two sectors. Since the 
introduction of neo-liberal reform in1991there was decline in fertilizer, food and 
credit and there was a shift from food to commercial crop. However, the 
consequences have not all been good. Agriculture growth has fallen below the 
population growth rates, the cost of production in agriculture has risen while the  
selling price of grains have decline and there has been a virtual collapse in 
agricultural technological progress and information dissemination systems. This 
has been the true face of the agrarian crisis that has made this sector non-
viable and investments decline. The rising food prices have had an upward 
influence on the industrial wages in India.  
 
Industrial growth in India is demand constrained (Rao 2009: 1282). Poor 
growth in the agricultural sector has not been conducive to agriculture demand 
led industrialisation, as this has led to a low demand for industrial goods in the 
country. The major concentration of development has been in the luxury and 
semi luxury commodities led growth targeted at the growing middle class. The 
demand generated by the middle class is small in comparison to the total 
potential size of the market for industrial goods, and this demand is soon 
saturated. Production and consumption of the industrial goods for the middle 
class and by the middle class are not wage goods but luxury goods. The 
production and consumption structure of industrialization, therefore, has 
excluded a vast mass of rural and urban poor. The exclusion process is 
accentuated by the fact that the pattern of this industrialization is highly capital 
intensive and not labour intensive, requiring only a small section trained 
employees. Therefore, there is no mechanism through which rural and urban 
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poor can be absorbed by these industries. The exclusive pattern of 
industrialization has generated peasant movement against land acquisition. 
Land for industrial development is a big concern today. At the same time socio-
political reactions towards acquiring agricultural land for industrial development 
has increasing led to conflict in many parts of India. In the process of 
development, these issues and challenges need to be addressed and 
reconciled in order for development and growth in the industrial and agricultural 
sectors.  
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